@umijs/core
See our website [umijs](https://umijs.org) for more information.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Org-wide maintainer transition on umijs packages, stable across versions. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Same org transition, no malicious behavior observed. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Same org transition, no malicious behavior observed. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Metadata-only regression, no behavioral change; consistent with unchanged provenance direction. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Config loader requiring local project config files, not attacker-controlled input. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New deps are first-party @umijs monorepo siblings, not external packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@umijs/babel-preset-umi | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling, used indirectly at build time. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established monorepo sub-package; sparse README and no keywords are typical for internal scoped packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@umijs/utils | AI (dependencies): @umijs/utils is a sibling package in the same UmiJS monorepo, always published at the same version. This dependency relationship is stable and expected across all versions. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): @umijs/core is a legitimate scoped package in the UmiJS monorepo, not a typosquat of 'cors'. This is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 314)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.6.82 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.81 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.80 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.79 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.78 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.77 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.76 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.75 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.74 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.73 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.72 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.71 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.70 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.69 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.68 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.67 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.66 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.65 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.64 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.63 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.62 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.61 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.59 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.58 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.57 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.56 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.55 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.54 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.53 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.52 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.51 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.50 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.49 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.48 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.47 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.46 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.45 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.44 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.43 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.42 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.41 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.40 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.39 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.38 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.37 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.36 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.35 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.34 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.33 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.32 | 2 / 3 | |
| 4.6.31 | 2 / 3 |
v4.6.82
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.81
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.80
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.79
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.78
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.77
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.76
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.75
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.74
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.73
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.72
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.71
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.70
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.69
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.55
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.54
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.53
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.52
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.51
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.50
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.49
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.48
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.47
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.46
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.45
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.44
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.43
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.42
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.41
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.40
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.39
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.38
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.37
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.36
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.35
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.34
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.33
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.32
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.31
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.