@umijs/preset-vue
@umijs/preset-vue
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-bulk-read | AI (semgrep): Fires inside vendored @vitejs/plugin-vue bundle; expected config-library behavior, stable across versions. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo sub-package with minimal README/description; not indicative of spam or malice. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 211)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.6.81 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.80 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.79 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.78 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.77 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.76 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.75 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.69 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.68 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.67 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.66 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.65 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.64 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.63 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.62 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.61 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.59 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.58 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.57 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.56 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.55 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.54 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.53 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.52 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.51 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.50 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.49 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.48 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.47 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.46 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.45 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.44 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.43 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.42 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.41 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.40 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.39 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.38 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.37 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.36 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.35 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.34 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.33 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.32 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.31 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.30 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.29 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.28 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.27 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.26 | 6 / 2 | |
| 4.6.25 | 6 / 2 |
v4.6.81
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.80
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.79
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.78
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.77
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.76
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (zoomdong07) on 2026-07-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.6.75
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (zoomdong07) on 2026-07-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.6.69
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.