@unikvs/opfs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with CI/CD automation; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Early-stage 0.0.x monorepo package; sparse metadata is expected, not indicative of spam/malware. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.6 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.