@unisphere/genie-types
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent across all versions; internal types package from known org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across all versions; low risk for this internal Kaltura package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal Kaltura types package; sparse README is expected for org-internal tooling, not a spam/phishing indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.16.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.14.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.13.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.9.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 1.8.3 | 5 / 0 |
v1.16.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.13.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.