@univ-lehavre/atlas-amarre
[](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17775106)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal university org package (@univ-lehavre scope); sparse metadata is expected for private/monorepo packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.7 | 7 / 18 | |
| 2.0.6 | 7 / 18 | |
| 2.0.2 | 7 / 18 | |
| 2.0.1 | 7 / 18 | |
| 2.0.0 | 7 / 18 |
v2.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.