@uniweb/runtime
Minimal runtime for loading Uniweb foundations
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@uniweb/theming | AI (dependencies): @uniweb/theming is a first-party dep from the same proximify publisher with a clean track record; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance absence is common; no other risk signals present for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.9 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.6.20 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v0.6.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.