@unrs/resolver-binding-openharmony-arm64
UnRS Resolver Node API
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a placeholder stub for a native binding target platform; consistent with the publisher's other binding packages. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Native binding stub; missing description is consistent with the package's role. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific NAPI binary shard; .node file is the sole deliverable, published with SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Binary-only platform shard packages legitimately have no deps, no code examples, and no keywords. | ai |
v1.12.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • resolver.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.