@uploadcare/cname-prefix
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): uploadcare-user is the Uploadcare org account with 8 approved packages; transition from individual to org account is expected. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.18.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 6.18.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 6.18.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 6.15.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.15.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 6.14.3 | 0 / 4 |
v6.18.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.18.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.18.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.15.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.15.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.14.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.