@uppy/drag-drop
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Uppy monorepo; dormancy reflects infrequent patch releases, not abandonment or takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): uppydev is the Uppy org account; legitimate consolidation under org publisher. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of individual maintainers consistent with org-account migration for transloadit/uppy. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 5.0.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 0 |
v5.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.