@uppy/drop-target
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): uppydev is the official Uppy org account publishing across the monorepo; transition from individual maintainer is expected. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): uppydev is the canonical Uppy org account; addition is a legitimate org consolidation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of individual maintainer consistent with org-account consolidation for the uppy monorepo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Major version bump (v4) after dormancy aligns with Uppy monorepo release cadence; not indicative of takeover. | ai |
v4.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.