@uruhalushia/sysproxy-linux-riscv64-gnu
跨平台系统代理设置工具 Node.js 原生绑定
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding; single .node file is the package's entire purpose, published with SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Minimal metadata is expected for a platform-split native binding sub-package with no deps. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.linux-riscv64-gnu.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.linux-riscv64-gnu.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.linux-riscv64-gnu.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.linux-riscv64-gnu.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.linux-riscv64-gnu.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.linux-riscv64-gnu.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.linux-riscv64-gnu.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
2 findingsMatched 6 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_NO_REPO_NO_HOME] No repository, homepage, or bugs URL — genuine packages almost always link somewhere. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 1 code file(s), 460 bytes total. • [S_EMPTY_MAIN] Entry point (index.js) is 18 bytes — effectively empty.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.