@uruhalushia/sysproxy-win32-arm64-msvc
跨平台系统代理设置工具 Node.js 原生绑定
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding shard; .node binary is the entire purpose of this package, backed by SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Narrow platform-shard packages legitimately have no deps, sparse README, and no keywords. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.win32-arm64-msvc.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.win32-arm64-msvc.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.win32-arm64-msvc.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.win32-arm64-msvc.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.win32-arm64-msvc.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.win32-arm64-msvc.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • sysproxy.win32-arm64-msvc.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.