@useragent-kit/host-wasm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Standard wasm-bindgen generated glue code; Reflect.get is idiomatic in wasm-bindgen JS output, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): WASM bindings package with no runtime deps is expected; no repo link is a minor gap but not indicative of spam for this package type. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 0 |
v0.4.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.