@utoo/pack-cli
Utoo pack cli
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.29 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.4.28 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.4.27 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.4.26 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.4.25 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.4.24 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.4.1 | 2 / 2 |
v1.4.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.24
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (elrrrrrrr) on 2026-07-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.