@uxland/harmonix
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lit | AI (phantom-deps): lit is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep fires because it's not directly imported in analyzed source, but this is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 0 |
v1.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.