@vaadin/hilla-react-signals
Signals for Hilla React
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:jouni.me | AI (email-domain): Vaadin is a well-known vendor; the jouni.me domain risk is theoretical and not an active threat for this established package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Vaadin publishes without Sigstore provenance consistently; stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 73)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 25.1.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.1.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.1.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.1.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.1.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.1.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 25.0.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.10.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.10.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.10.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.10.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.10.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.10.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.17 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.16 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.15 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.14 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.13 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.11 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.9.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.16 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.15 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.14 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.13 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.11 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 24.8.8 | 3 / 0 |
v25.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v25.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.10.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.10.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.10.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.9.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.9.2
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.9.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.9.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.8.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.8.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.8.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.8.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.8.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.8.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.8.10
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.8.9
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.8.8
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.