@vaadin/vaadin-item
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Vaadin publishes all their packages without Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 23.6.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.6.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.6.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.6.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.5.13 | 1 / 0 |
v23.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.6.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.5.13
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.