@vaadin/vaadin-material-styles
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polymer/polymer | AI (dependencies): @polymer/polymer is a well-known Google Polymer library and a long-standing legitimate dependency of Vaadin web components. This is stable for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@polymer/polymer | AI (phantom-deps): Polymer is declared as a dependency and referenced in config files; its indirect usage pattern is consistent with a theme/styles package in the Vaadin ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Vaadin is an established publisher with hundreds of versions; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 24.10.3 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.10.2 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.10.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.10.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.15 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.14 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.13 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.12 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.11 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.10 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.9 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.8 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.7 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.6 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.5 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.4 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.9.3 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.8.14 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.8.13 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.8.12 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.8.11 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.8.10 | 3 / 5 | |
| 24.7.5 | 3 / 5 | |
| 23.6.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 23.6.3 | 2 / 5 |
v24.10.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.10.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.9.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.9.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.7.5
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'jouni.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.