@varlock/infisical-plugin
Varlock plugin to load secrets from Infisical
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/plugin.cjs | AI (source-diff): tsup-bundled CJS output; minified lines are expected for this build artifact. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/plugin.cjs | AI (source-diff): Network calls are to Infisical API; child_process comes from bundled SDK deps — expected for a secrets plugin. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a deliberate placeholder version for this monorepo package, not a malicious throwaway. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Stub/reserved namespace package with empty files; low-value signals are expected here. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.6
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.