@vates/generator-toolbox
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): b-nollet is an established Vates SAS contributor with 3 approved packages; handoff within same org. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 5 |
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.