@vectorize-io/hindsight-openclaw
Hindsight memory plugin for OpenClaw - biomimetic long-term memory with fact extraction
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@vectorize-io/hindsight-agent-sdk | AI (dependencies): First-party dep from same @vectorize-io org; consistent with internal SDK refactor. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm); no other risk signals present to amplify this. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.7.7 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.7.6 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.7.5 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.7.4 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.7.3 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.7.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.6.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.5.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.19 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.18 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.17 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.16 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.15 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.14 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.13 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.12 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.11 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.10 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.9 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.8 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.7 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.4 | 1 / 4 |
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.