@velora-dex/sdk
Velora SDK
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@paraswap/core | AI (dependencies): @paraswap/core is a well-known DeFi routing library; stable dependency for this DEX SDK across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Absence of Sigstore provenance is common; no other indicators of supply-chain risk for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.5.4 | 3 / 28 | |
| 9.5.3 | 3 / 28 | |
| 9.5.2 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.5.1 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.5.0 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.4.2 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.4.0 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.3.6 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.3.5 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.3.4 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.3.3 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.3.2 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.3.1 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.3.0 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.2.1 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.2.0 | 3 / 22 | |
| 9.1.0 | 2 / 22 | |
| 9.0.0 | 2 / 22 |
v9.5.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (velenir) than the most recent previously approved version (andrii-velora) on 2026-06-02, but velenir is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (nazariikysel) than the most recent previously approved version (velenir) on 2026-03-23, but nazariikysel is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.3.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (andriyshuma) than the most recent previously approved version (velenir) on 2026-03-18, but andriyshuma is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.3.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (andriyshuma) than the most recent previously approved version (velenir) on 2026-03-13, but andriyshuma is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.3.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (andriyshuma) than the most recent previously approved version (velenir) on 2026-01-23, but andriyshuma is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (andriyshuma) than the most recent previously approved version (velenir) on 2026-01-02, but andriyshuma is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.