@vercel/config
A TypeScript SDK for programmatically configuring Vercel projects
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @vercel/routing-utils is a first-party Vercel package; addition is expected for this SDK. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Large Vercel org with frequent team rotation; publisher is the trusted vercel-release-bot with SLSA attestation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Same rationale — org-level team churn, not indicative of takeover given verified CI publishing. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:magic.io | AI (email-domain): SLSA provenance attestation from vercel-release-bot CI/CD pipeline mitigates identity-hijack risk via email domain. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:pretty-cache-header | AI (dependencies): Vercel-published package with SLSA provenance; dep risk is low and stable for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@vercel/routing-utils | AI (dependencies): First-party Vercel dependency from the same monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 38 of 38)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.4.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.41 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.40 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.39 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.38 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.37 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.36 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.35 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.33 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.32 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.31 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.30 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.29 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.28 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.27 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.26 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.25 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.24 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.0.23 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.22 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.21 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.20 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.19 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.18 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.17 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.16 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.14 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.12 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.10 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.9 | 2 / 8 |
v0.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.40
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.39
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.38
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.30
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.29
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.28
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.27
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.26
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.25
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.24
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.