@vercel/edge-config-fs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Intentional stub/redirect package from Vercel's official release bot; sparse metadata is expected for a deprecation shim. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.0
2 findingsMatched 4 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_PUBLISHER_MASS_PRODUCTION] Maintainer 'gkaragkiaouris' owns 38 packages, ≥70% share a templated name shape. • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.