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@vercel/flags-core

npm
10
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

vercel-release-botzeit-bot

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Internal Vercel scoped package; sparse metadata is a consistent pattern across their published packages, not a spam signal. ai
npm-metadata no-description AI (npm-metadata): Consistent with Vercel's internal package publishing pattern; not indicative of malice. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Trusted publisher (vercel-release-bot) with strong track record; absence of provenance is not a risk here. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:jose AI (phantom-deps): jose is a declared runtime dependency in package.json; likely used indirectly via re-exports or internal modules not directly imported at top level. ai

Versions (showing 10 of 10)

Version Deps Published
1.4.0 3 / 7
1.3.1 3 / 7
1.2.1 3 / 7
1.2.0 3 / 7
1.1.1 3 / 7
1.1.0 3 / 8
1.0.1 3 / 9
1.0.0 3 / 9
0.1.8 3 / 7
0.1.7 3 / 7

v1.4.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.3.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.8

2 findings
HIGH Low-value / spam package indicators (5 signals, score 8) bogus-package

Matched 5 signal(s), weighted score 8: • [S_PUBLISHER_MASS_PRODUCTION] Maintainer 'gkaragkiaouris' owns 38 packages, ≥70% share a templated name shape. • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_DESC_MATCHES_NAME] Description is empty or just restates the package name. • [S_NO_REPO_NO_HOME] No repository, homepage, or bugs URL — genuine packages almost always link somewhere. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.7

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.