@vercel/next
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): dist/mappings.wasm is legitimate build output in official Vercel package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:nuxt | AI (typosquat): @vercel/next is the official Vercel Next.js runtime, not a typosquat of nuxt. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:jest | AI (typosquat): Legitimate scoped Vercel package; no relation to jest. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:knex | AI (typosquat): Legitimate scoped Vercel package; no relation to knex. | ai |
Versions (showing 58 of 158)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.9.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.8.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.11 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.10 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.9 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.8 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.7 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.6 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.4 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.3 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.2 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.1 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.7.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.6.2 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.6.1 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.6.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.5.2 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.5.1 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.5.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.4.5 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.4.4 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.4.2 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.4.1 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.4.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.21 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.20 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.19 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.18 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.17 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.16 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.15 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.14 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.13 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.12 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.11 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.10 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.9 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.8 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.7 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.6 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.5 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.4 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.3 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.2 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.1 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.3.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.18 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.17 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.16 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.15 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.14 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.13 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.12 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.11 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.10 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.9 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.8 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.7 | 1 / 38 |
v4.7.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.21
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.20
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.19
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.18
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.17
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.16
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.15
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.14
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.13
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.12
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.18
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.17
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.16
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.15
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.14
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.13
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.12
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/mappings.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.