@vercel/prepare-flags-definitions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Vercel migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Org-wide Vercel maintainer list cleanup; not indicative of takeover given SLSA provenance and official repo. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): zeit-bot is a known Vercel automation account; consistent with org CI pipeline. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal Vercel tooling package; missing metadata is expected, not a spam/malware indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Vercel packages consistently published without provenance; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai |
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'magic.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.