@versini/ui-svgicon
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped UI component library with no runtime deps; sparse metadata is expected for this package type. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Established package in a known monorepo; missing description is cosmetic, not a risk signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.4.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.2.1 | 0 / 0 |
v4.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.