@vertz/native-compiler-linux-arm64
Vertz native compiler binary for Linux arm64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-native .node binary is the entire purpose of this package; SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD build integrity. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.80 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.78 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.76 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.75 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.74 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.73 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.71 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.70 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.68 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.67 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.66 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.80
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.78
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.76
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.75
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.74
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.73
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.71
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.70
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.68
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.67
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.66
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vertz-compiler.linux-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.