@vertz/server
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:semver | AI (typosquat): @vertz/server is a scoped monorepo package (server runtime), not a typosquat of semver; name similarity is coincidental. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@vertz/db | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@vertz/core | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
v0.2.56
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.54
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.