@vforsh/argus
CLI package for Argus.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yargs | AI (typosquat): Scoped under publisher's own namespace @vforsh; not an impersonation of yargs. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.16 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.15 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.1.14 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.1.13 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 0 |
v0.1.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.