@vibe-forge/benchmark
Benchmark discovery and execution for Vibe Forge
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Idiomatic child-process env construction; spreading process.env as base before selective overrides is standard and not a data-exfiltration risk here. | ai |
v3.3.1
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 53 | 54 | return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { > 55 | const childEnv: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = { ...process.env } 56 | for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env ?? {})) { 57 | if (value != null) {
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.3
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 53 | 54 | return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { > 55 | const childEnv: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = { ...process.env } 56 | for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env ?? {})) { 57 | if (value != null) {
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.