@vireya/rpc
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped RPC package; name similarity to 'pg' is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 7 |
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.