@visactor/vrender
```typescript import { xxx } from '@visactor/vrender'; ```
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@visactor/vrender-core | AI (dependencies): Pinned sibling monorepo dep; same version, same publisher, normal pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@visactor/vrender-kits | AI (dependencies): Pinned sibling monorepo dep; same version, same publisher, normal pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@visactor/vrender-animate | AI (dependencies): Pinned sibling monorepo dep; same version, same publisher, normal pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@visactor/vrender-components | AI (dependencies): Pinned sibling monorepo dep; same version, same publisher, normal pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.5 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.1.4 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.1.3 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.1.2 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.1.1 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.1.0 | 4 / 21 | |
| 1.0.46 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.45 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.44 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.43 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.42 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.41 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.40 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.39 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.38 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.37 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.36 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.35 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.34 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.33 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.32 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.31 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.30 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.29 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.28 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.27 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.26 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.25 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.24 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.23 | 4 / 20 | |
| 1.0.22 | 4 / 20 | |
| 0.22.19 | 2 / 20 |
v1.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.40
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.39
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.38
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.32
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (purpose233) on 2025-12-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.