@visactor/vseed
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance; legitimate CI/CD migration for VisActor org. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/cjs/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): Standard rslib/webpack minified bundle; not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/cjs/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): webpack __rslib_import_meta_url__ pattern triggers false positive; no actual network+eval payload present. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/static/js/index.7ac2af0b.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-minified application bundle; sample shows vseed pipeline logic, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:remeda | AI (phantom-deps): remeda is a declared runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires because it may be used indirectly or in type-level code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/static/js/271.b02e15b2.js | AI (source-diff): File is webpack-minified zod library bundle; sample shows recognizable zod internals, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/static/js/271.b02e15b2.js | AI (source-diff): Same webpack bundle; no actual dropper/loader pattern visible in sample — false positive from minified zod code. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): VisActor monorepo package; sparse metadata is typical for internal libs, not spam/malware. | ai |
Versions (showing 29 of 29)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.6 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.5.5 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.5.4 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.5.3 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.5.2 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.5.1 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.5.0 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.4.28 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.4.27 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.4.22 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.0.19 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.0.18 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.17 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.16 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.15 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.14 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.12 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.11 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.10 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.9 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.6 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 8 |
v0.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.28
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.27
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.22
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.