@visactor/vtable
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): liufangfang is a known VisActor org maintainer with 114 approved packages and no rejections; transition appears legitimate. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@visactor/vdataset | AI (dependencies): Same VisActor org dependency; stable sibling package used across the vtable ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large established monorepo package; provenance absence is consistent across all @visactor/* releases. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.26.1 | 12 / 53 | |
| 1.26.0 | 12 / 53 | |
| 1.23.2 | 12 / 53 | |
| 1.18.12 | 11 / 51 |
v1.26.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.26.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.23.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.18.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.