@visulima/pail
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/packem_shared/index-DqKWykfa.js | AI (source-diff): Standard packem bundler output; sample shows readable ANSI/emoji utilities, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/packem_shared/format-label-CpyyTBom.js | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output (packem); content is readable logging/formatting logic, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/packem_shared/index-CysYvHXs.js | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output; content is ANSI/terminal handling utilities, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/progress-bar.js | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output; content is clearly a progress bar implementation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/spinner.js | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output; content is spinner animation frames and logic. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@visulima/colorize | AI (dependencies): Same-monorepo sibling package; stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 0 |
v3.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.