@vitejs/plugin-rsc
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/plugin-C27mwbgw.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Vite plugin RPC/dev-server code, not a loader; matches package's stated RSC functionality. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): CI publish metadata quirk, not a behavioral signal; SLSA attestation still present. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/plugin-DbK8rF7n.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output of the plugin core, no exfiltration destination present. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/plugin-ByvxS0by.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Vite plugin dev-server code (rpc/module runner), not injected dropper logic. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/plugin-DPZnhMn5.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Vite plugin build output; module-runner/RPC code inherent to an RSC build tool, no hostile target. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Rebundle of build tool output produces many dist files; benign for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/plugin-BOTpkess.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Vite plugin dist doing module transform/RPC; no hostile target. Stable FP for this build tool. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): vitejs org uses CI-automated publishing; maintainer list changes are expected and SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI origin. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/plugin-BK29Va7z.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build artifact with standard Node/Vite imports; no actual network fetch or dynamic eval present. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/plugin-COe11H-Q.js | AI (source-diff): New bundled dist file contains standard Vite plugin imports; no actual dropper/malware pattern present. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.32 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.31 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.30 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.29 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.28 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.27 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.26 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.25 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.24 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.5.23 | 8 / 16 |
v0.5.32
3 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v0.5.31
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.30
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.29
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.28
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.