@vitessce/ome-tiff
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:d3-array | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo build artifact; dependency may be consumed transitively or via bundler config. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash-es | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo build artifact; dependency may be consumed transitively or via bundler config. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@vitessce/error | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@vitessce/utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@vitessce/sets-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@vitessce/constants-internal | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.9.11 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.10 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.9 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.8 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.7 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.6 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.5 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.4 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.9.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.8.13 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.8.10 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.8.9 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.8.8 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.8.7 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.8.6 | 12 / 0 |
v3.9.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.13
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2025-12-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.8.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.