@vitessce/spatial-zarr
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-DJV3mJxe.js | AI (source-diff): Vite/rollup bundle output, not true obfuscation; readable library code. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-DJV3mJxe.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled decoder library code, no malicious network+exec behavior found. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-f6jewSRf.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Esri LERC decoder, minified not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-DL1mSZGK.js | AI (source-diff): Esri LERC decoder bundled via Vite, legitimate library code. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-BU57EnXK.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled app code (map/network viz lib), no dropper behavior present. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-BU57EnXK.js | AI (source-diff): Vite bundle output with long minified lines, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-s5uXlzCq.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled library code (map/codec libs), no malicious network+exec behavior found. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-CaiPQuPF.js | AI (source-diff): Minified Esri LERC codec library bundled by build, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-s5uXlzCq.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled vite/rollup output, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-O5TnEDtg.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build artifact, no malicious network/exec behavior found. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-O5TnEDtg.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled output, readable code, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-BE7AO24C.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Esri LERC decoder library, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-4QDR8Tjo.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled LERC decoder (Esri library), minified not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-L_3KnJHu.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled app code with normal fetch/eval-like patterns from dependencies, no malicious destination found. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-L_3KnJHu.js | AI (source-diff): Vite/rollup bundle output, not true obfuscation; matches package build tooling. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-BlBjyogg.js | AI (source-diff): Esri LERC decoder bundled via Vite, legitimate library with copyright header. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-hzXpsWKL.js | AI (source-diff): Bundler-produced code, no concrete malicious network/exec behavior found in sample. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-hzXpsWKL.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Vite output, not true obfuscation; readable source with clear module structure. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-C-gXUhRi.js | AI (source-diff): Vite/Rollup bundle output for geospatial libs, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-wMX1hw4T.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled LERC/pako decoder library, standard minified build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-C-gXUhRi.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled minified code triggers pattern match; no concrete malicious network/exec behavior found. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-B0TRnLza.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Esri LERC decoder library, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-Opql4jgY.js | AI (source-diff): Vite/Rollup bundled output, not true obfuscation; sample shows readable JS with source structure. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-Opql4jgY.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build artifact triggers net+exec pattern match, no malicious behavior in sample. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-2t0pAbDy.js | AI (source-diff): False positive on bundled decoder/network code, no dropper behavior. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-B4aKq5O2.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Esri LERC decoder library, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-2t0pAbDy.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Vite/Rollup output, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-C-UIQtDR.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled dist output, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-BE-pX_4s.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled third-party LERC/pako decoder library, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-C-UIQtDR.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled app code (view types etc.), no malicious network/exec behavior shown. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-C-i6H75_.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled JS with normal fetch/eval patterns from deps, no malicious destination. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-Dcax99Ml.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Esri LERC decoder library, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-C-i6H75_.js | AI (source-diff): Vite bundle output for a large legit package, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-xFqX0yiB.js | AI (source-diff): False positive: bundled decoder/library code, no malicious network+exec behavior. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Same-org sibling package @vitessce/zarr-utils, versioned in lockstep. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-C2Ws2n1e.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled LERC decoder library, minified not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-xFqX0yiB.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Vite output, not true obfuscation; matches package's stated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index-BhNyOJPs.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls and dynamic property access in a spatial viz bundle are expected; no dropper pattern present. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lerc-aoreA0lx.js | AI (source-diff): LERC decoder (Esri Apache-licensed) bundled via Vite; long lines from minified third-party codec, not malicious obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-BhNyOJPs.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled ESM output; readable code, not obfuscated. Stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:parquet-wasm | AI (phantom-deps): Platform-specific binary dep; phantom-dep heuristic not applicable here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:d3-array | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo package; d3-array used transitively or in config, stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.0 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.11 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.10 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.9 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.8 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.7 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.6 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.5 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.4 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.3 | 15 / 3 | |
| 3.9.2 | 14 / 3 | |
| 3.9.1 | 14 / 3 | |
| 3.9.0 | 14 / 3 | |
| 3.8.13 | 14 / 2 | |
| 3.8.10 | 14 / 2 | |
| 3.8.9 | 14 / 2 | |
| 3.8.8 | 14 / 2 | |
| 3.8.7 | 14 / 2 | |
| 3.8.6 | 14 / 2 |
v4.0.0
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.6
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2026-03-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.9.5
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2026-02-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.9.4
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2026-02-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.9.3
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2026-02-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.9.2
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2026-02-05, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.9.1
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2026-01-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.9.0
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2026-01-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.8.13
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (keller-mark) on 2025-12-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.8.10
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.9
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.8
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.7
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.