@vitessce/zarr
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/blosc-DvQQ1ST0.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten-generated WASM JS wrapper for blosc codec; minified output is expected for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/lz4-BIbM36RN.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten-generated WASM JS wrapper for lz4 codec; minified output is expected for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/zstd-CO575QiM.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten-generated WASM JS wrapper for zstd codec; minified output is expected for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI-published release with SLSA attestation; consistent with a toolchain migration, not takeover. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ol | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo package; ol is a peer/optional dep used conditionally, not a direct import. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@vitessce/image-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep in monorepo; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:d3-array | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo package; d3-array used transitively or conditionally. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:apache-arrow | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo package; apache-arrow used conditionally for parquet/arrow data loading. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:parquet-wasm | AI (phantom-deps): Platform-specific binary dep; expected phantom pattern for wasm packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@vitessce/utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep in monorepo; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 46 of 46)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.9.11 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.10 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.9 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.8 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.7 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.6 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.5 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.4 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.3 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.2 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.1 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.9.0 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.13 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.10 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.9 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.8 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.7 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.6 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.5 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.4 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.3 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.2 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.1 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.8.0 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.7.1 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.7.0 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.18 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.17 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.16 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.15 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.14 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.13 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.12 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.11 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.10 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.9 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.8 | 15 / 1 | |
| 3.6.7 | 14 / 1 | |
| 3.6.6 | 14 / 1 | |
| 3.6.5 | 14 / 1 | |
| 3.6.4 | 14 / 1 | |
| 3.6.3 | 14 / 1 | |
| 3.6.2 | 14 / 1 | |
| 3.6.1 | 14 / 1 | |
| 3.6.0 | 14 / 1 | |
| 3.5.12 | 14 / 1 |
v3.9.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.5
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.4
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.3
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.2
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.1
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.0
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.1
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.7.0
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.