@vnodes/prisma
@vnodes/prisma
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.37 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.35 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.33 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.27 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.25 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.23 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.15 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.11 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.8 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 4 |
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.