@voiceflow/test-common
Reusable utilities for writing tests.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Voiceflow org package with consistent publish history; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v2.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.