@voidzero-dev/vite-plus-darwin-arm64
The Unified Toolchain for the Web
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binary shard packages commonly use 0.0.0 as a placeholder version; this is a known pattern for broooooklyn's napi-rs-based packages. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific native binary shim package; minimal metadata, no deps, tiny payload, and no JS code are all expected characteristics of this package type. SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI/CD origin. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.23 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.22 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.21 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.20 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.19 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.18 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.17 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.16 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.