@volcengine/cp
swagger client for @volcengine/cp
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped @volcengine package; not a typosquat of pg. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped @volcengine package; not a typosquat of qs. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped @volcengine package; not a typosquat of yup. | ai |
v1.0.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (diyijienigui) than the most recent previously approved version (tangjinwei123) on 2026-06-04, but diyijienigui is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.