@vrsen/agentswarm-cli-windows-arm64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary stub package; no deps/tiny payload/no description are expected for OS+CPU-targeted distribution packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.36 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.35 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.34 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.32 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.31 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.29 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.28 | 0 / 0 |
v1.4.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.