@vue-oxlint/binding-linux-arm64-musl
Placeholder. Real release coming soon.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node binary is the intended artifact, built via attested CI. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with SLSA-attested CI publishing; not an account compromise signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Intentional placeholder for a native binding; empty payload and missing metadata are expected for this package type. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is the conventional version for placeholder/name-reservation packages in scoped native binding sets. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.15.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.14.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.13.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.12.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.linux-arm64-musl.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.