@vue-oxlint/binding-win32-ia32-msvc
Placeholder. Real release coming soon.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific NAPI binding package; the .node binary is the intended deliverable, published via attested CI/CD. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish (liangmi) to GitHub Actions CI/CD is expected and backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Explicit placeholder package reserving a namespace for a native binding; 0.0.0 is intentional. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Placeholder namespace reservation; no deps/readme/repo is expected for this pattern. | ai |
v0.14.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.win32-ia32-msvc.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.win32-ia32-msvc.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vue-oxlint-toolkit.win32-ia32-msvc.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.