@vue/language-plugin-pug
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | regressed-provenance | AI (provenance): Known maintainer manual publish on official vuejs repo; not compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; provenance improved, benign for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get() used in a Proxy trap for source-map offset proxying — legitimate pattern in this monorepo package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:pug-parser | AI (dependencies): pug-parser is a standard pug ecosystem package; stable dependency for this Vue pug plugin. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:muggle-string | AI (dependencies): muggle-string is a Volar/Vue tooling utility; stable dependency for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 40 of 40)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.3.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.3.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.3.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.3.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.3.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.3.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.3.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.3.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.8 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.11 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.10 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.9 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.8 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 3 |
v3.3.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.