@vue/ref-transform
@vue/ref-transform
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@vue/compiler-core | AI (dependencies): @vue/compiler-core is a first-party Vue.js core package from the same publisher (yyx990803/Evan You) and monorepo; this dependency is expected and stable across all versions of @vue/ref-transform. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): yyx990803 is Evan You, creator of Vue.js — the spam-flagged publisher signal is a false positive for this well-known ecosystem author. Description style is consistent across all @vue/* packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance adoption; no provenance is expected for this era of Vue.js releases. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.24 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.23 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.22 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.21 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.20 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.19 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.18 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.16 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.15 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.14 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.13 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.12 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.11 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.9 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.2.5 | 5 / 1 |
v3.2.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.